(CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Papers series. The impetus for this series that concerns topics relevant to ongoing and future operations came from the Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, directed CSI to examine historical topics that would benefit American and coalition soldiers and planners in both Iraq today, and in the broader GWOT spectrum now and in the future. One of those topics was the transition from combat (Phase III) operations to stability (Phase IV) operations, to use the current phasing construct familiar to campaign planners. Mr. David Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and current CSI historian, has produced a study that examines nine critical factors that should be addressed in stabilization planning and execution. Mr. Cavaleri then presents a case study of the US occupation of Japan after World War II, followed by a parallel analysis of the case study and ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq through the lens of the critical planning factors. This study serves as a bridge between the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) found in stability operations “how-to” manuals and the broader military operations other than war (MOOTW) concepts found in joint doctrine. Its purpose was to identify key themes that merit consideration when planning or conducting transitions between combat operations and stability operations. These themes were identified by combining a review of joint and US Army stability operations doctrine with a specific case study analysis of the US occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 and then extrapolated those themes to current stability operations to assess their applicability. The Japanese occupation is useful as a case study because it required that occupation forces address several challenges similar to those facing current stability operations in the Middle East, such as a fundamental change in governance philosophy, a long-term democratization program, a critical regional security challenge, and a complex economic reconstruction challenge. This analysis is not designed to serve as a “one answer fits all challenges” solution set, but rather as a practical vehicle for informing time-constrained professionals operating at the tactical and operational levels. One can easily identify several instances where the US Army has faced stability operations challenges; Cuba, Germany, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Vietnam immediately come to mind. Each case involved stability operations challenges unique to its environment, but only one time during the 20th century did the United States take the lead in stabilizing the entire infrastructure—political, economic, industrial, military, educational, and even societal—of a former enemy. During this complex stability operation, the US Army implemented a number of planning themes related to transitioning between the full spectrum operations components of offense/defense and stability/support. These themes were applied, depending on the US Army’s ability to manipulate each, with varying degrees of success. A RAND Corporation study published in 2003, titled America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, developed six such themes, traced each through seven case studies, and concluded by drawing implications for future US military operations.

Hide more