preferences of the individual members of the collectivity. It therefore provides a basis for a critical evaluation of democratic theory in general as well as of the theory of economic policy and welfare economics in particular. Mr. Arrow's approach is axiomatic. Several apparently reasonable conditions for the process of social choice are laid down ; these require essentially that social choice be responsive to the desires of individuals and that, among any given set of possible alternatives, social choice depend only on the preferences of the individuals among the members of that set. It is then shown that this set of conditions is in fact logically inconsistent. That is, there is no democratic constitution, no matter how complicated, which can always be sure of producing a method of social choice that satisfies certain ordinary properties of coherence. Some possible ways out of this dilemma are then explored, and the whole is related to some of the existing literature. The book has had a profound impact on the work of economists and political scientists working in this area in the years since it was first published, and it continues to provide intellectual stimulation. Mr. Arrow is professor of economics at Harvard University.

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